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THE THREATENED FUTURE OF
HOME VIDEO RECORDERS-
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS V. SONY
The evolution of the copyright law has been marked by repeated confron-
tation with technological advancements.' At the inception of the initial
Copyright Act,' Congress could not possibly have envisioned all the pro-
gressions in the arts and sciences that would continually emerge. It has,
therefore, gradually expanded the scope of copyright protection by amend-
ing and revising the Act3 to encompass new advancements. Additionally,
however, these advancements have created the need to limit the author's or
inventor's rights under the Copyright Act where the public interest has been
1. The major technological innovations that have affected the scope and applicability of
the copyright law are: motion pictures, sound recordings, radio and television, photocopying,
cable television, microfilm, video tapes, and computer programs. Each of these advancements
has been addressed to some extent within the Copyright Act, either expanding the copyright
protection or expanding the permissible uses of copyrighted materials. Legislative action has
generally followed judicial attempts at reconciling issues presented by technological progres-
sion. CRC SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, Impact of Information Technology on Copyright Law in
the Use of Computerized, Scientific and Technological Information Systems, in TECHNOLOGY
AND COPYRIGHT 1"37 (G. Bush & R. Dreyfuss ed. 1979). For a discussion of the copyright ques-
tions various technologies have raised, see generally D. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK
(1978) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK], Fine, Record Piracy and Modern Problems of Inno-
cent Infringement: A Comparative Analysis of United States and British Copyright Law, 21
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 357 (1981); Library Photocopying; An International Perspective, 26
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 53 (1981); The Supreme Court and Copyright Liability for
Retransmission of Television and Radio Signals: A Dubious Performance, 26 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 127 (1981); Note, Copyrights, Computers and Confusion, 56 CAL. ST. B.J.
148 (1981).
2. The first Copyright Act was implemented in 1790. Copyright Act, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
(1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Its stated purpose
was to encourage learning, which it accomplished by granting exclusive statutory protection to
authors of maps, charts, and books with respect to printing, reprinting, publishing, or vending
such works. Id.
3. Subsequent to the initial Copyright Act, four comprehensive revisions were adopted in
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976, although numerous amendments to the Act were implemented on
a piecemeal basis. The copyright revision approved on February 3, 1831 added musical com-
positions to the list of copyrightable works and lengthened the basic period of 14 years to 28
years for statutory protection. Copyright Act, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 437 (1831) (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). On July 8, 1870, the Act was consolidated to en-
compass both the copyright and patent statutes. Additionally, this revision added fine arts to
the scope of the statutory protection and included copying within the category of exclusive
rights. Copyright Act, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The third revision, enacted March 4, 1909, among other things ex-
panded the exclusive rights to encompass five separate categories that exist in similar form in
the current code: to reproduce and sell the work; to prepare derivative works; to perform a
dramatic work; to use or authorize the use of a work in a lecture, sermon, or similar public
manner and; to perform a musical work. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current
version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). While the 1976 revision retains much
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determined to be superior.4 The most significant limitation has been the
doctrine of fair use which allows a copyrighted material to be used in a
reasonable manner without an express license.'
The recent advent of the video cassette recorder has once again brought
into question the scope of the copyright protection and the applicability of
the doctrine of fair use. As a result of the prominence these recorders are
gaining in American homes, two courts' have thus far been asked to deter-
mine whether off-the-air video taping,7 for private, noncommercial pur-
poses, infringes upon the copyright interests in the original television
materials. In Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of America," the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded. that the in-home, noncommercial
video reproduction of copyrighted materials violated the United States
copyright laws." In doing so, the Sony court upheld the copyright holder's
economic interest at the expense of the public's interest in accessibility to
of the structure of the 1909 Act, some major departures were made. The old Act left it up to
the states to afford protection to unpublished works. The new Act provides federal protection
from the time the work becomes tangible. The new Act also changes the statutory copyright
period to the author's lifetime plus an additional 50 years. Perhaps most importantly, the new
law provides a more detailed explanation of the scope of the exclusive rights of ownership
through the limitations set forth in §§ 107-118. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976
Supp. IV. 1980). For historical background and discussion of the copyright law, see H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659,
5660; R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1912); CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REvISION (1973) [hereinafter cited as OMNIBUS]; HANDBOOK,
supra note 1; M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1981) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
4. The Copyright Act provides 12 sections of limitations on the scope of the copyright
holder's interest. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). These sections entail
limitations with respect to: fair use; reproduction by libraries and archives; transfer of copy or
phonorecord; exemption of certain performances and displays; secondary transmissions;
ephemeral recordings; pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works; .sound recordings; compulsory
licenses for phonorecords; coin operated phonorecord players; computers and similar informa-
tion systems; noncommercial broadcasting. Id.
5. The doctrine of fair use.is a judicially created, discretionary limitation that allows
courts to uphold uses of copyrighted works that would otherwise constitute copyright in-
fringement. The doctrine is to be applied on a case-by-case basis where the court deems the in-
terest in the public's accessibility to the copyrighted work to be superior in importance to the
copyright holder's exclusive rights. See infra notes 33-60 and accompanying text.
6. The two courts thus far have been the United States District Court for the Central
District of California in Universal City Studios vi Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), .and the Ninth Circuit-Court of Appeals in a subsequent appeal of the above case,
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2927 (1982).
7. Video recorders, such as the Sony Betamax, enable audio-visual reproductions of televi-
sion programs to be made as the programs are being broadcast over the airwaves. These
recorders also provide for subsequent viewing of the tapes made as well as for the viewing of
pre-recorded, commercially marketed video tapes by transmitting the taped materials from the
recorder to the television screen. The process is basically similar to the use of audio tape
recorders.
8. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
9. Id. at 969.
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this technological advancement. From a practical standpoint, Sony has
presented a difficult precedent'0 and should be thoroughly examined.
A close analysis of the legislative history of the copyright laws and the
limited rights granted under the Copyright Act reveals that the Sony court
erred in determining that the fair use doctrine did not justify the private,
noncommercial use of video recorders. In misconstruing the legislative in-
tent of the Copyright Act," the Sony court has threatened the technological
value of video recorders to the public. Future courts should look closely at
the legislative history that allows a similar type of reproduction in the
context of sound recording.' 2 This history provides the most analogous ex-
ample of legislative direction on the video recording issue.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, Congress is vested with the
power to promote the public interest in the arts and sciences.' 3 This con-
10. In terms of enforcement, there does not appear to be any feasible means of controlling
video recorder use. If the recorders are taken off the market, a problem remains as to the
recorders which have already been purchased. Imposing a fee on the sale of recorders would
raise a question as to how those fees could adequately be distributed to copyright holders.
Equipping the recorders with an automatic erase after the first playback of a tape would deter
the uninfringing use of viewing commercially marketed tapes. Consumers would not spend the
money for pre-recorded tapes if their investment would be destroyed after the first viewing.
For suggested alternatives to the video dilemma, see Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun
Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49 (1981); Comment, The Conscientious Fair User's Guide
to (he Copyright Act of 1976: Video Recordation and Its Fair Use, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 317,
361 (1981); Note, Copyright: Gone with the Betamax, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 45
(1978).
11. The Sony court appeared to be more concerned with the interests of the copyright
holder than achieving the primary goal of the Copyright Act, to promote broad ac-
cessibility of the public to information and ideas. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1566, 1572. This history pertains to the sound recording amendment, enacted in
1971, which brought sound recordings under the scope of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C.
§ 114 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). According to the legislative history, the unlicensed reproduction
of sound recordings for private, noncommercial use does not constitute copyright infringe-
ment. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The article provides in pertinent part: "The Congress
-shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries .. " Id.
Despite this constitutional provision, however, copyright is not a constitutionally protected
interest. In some cases the public's interest in the copyrighted materials may, nevertheless, war-
rant constitutional protection through the first amendment. The first amendment guarantees
reasonable access to information as well as the right to receive information and ideas. See
Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (the scope of the first amendment's veil of
protection encompasses the right to receive information); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the public has the right to receive access to information and ideas);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (the widest possible dissemination of
information is essential to the first amendment and the public welfare). Thus, where the
public's interest bears constitutional weight it must necessarily prevail over the copyright
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stitutional authority allows Congress to protect the authors' and inventors'
interests in receiving just compensation for their works. 4 Accordingly, the
Copyright Act 5 grants to the copyright holder a limited monopoly interest 6
in any tangible, original work."
Although the Act vests in the author or inventor exclusive rights regard-
holder's statutory interest. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 112-13 (1973) (although the broadcaster is not without first amendment protec-
tion, it is the right of the viewers and listeners that is paramount).
14. The economic philosophy behind the copyright clause of the United States Constitution
has been judicially interpreted to be that the encouragement of creative works for the benefit
of the public will best be served by granting to the author valuable rights in his work. Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). For subsequent judicial enunciations of this philosophy, see
Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp. 875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
aff'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Bell v. Pro Arts, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 474, 482 (N.D. Ohio
1973), affd, 511 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975).
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Subject to §§ 107-118, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly.
Id.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This section defines the types of work
that are eligible for copyright protection. The work must be original although not necessarily
novel and the medium of expression must be a tangible form. Thus, ideas themselves are not
copyrightable because they are not tangible and news or facts are not copyrightable because
they are not original. OMNIBUS, supra note 3, at 6-7.
While § 102 does provide an exemplary list of the types of copyrightable works, the language
"any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed" indicates flexibility in the,
scope of copyrightable materials. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). New forms of ex-
pression are constantly coming into being. Thus, this wording allows for statutory extension
without the need for legislative changes. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 historical note (West 1977).
The Copyright Act does not compel the holder to register with the Office of Copyrights as a
requisite for certain infringement remedies. What the Act does require, however, is notice of
the copyright to be displayed on all publicly distributed copies of the work. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 401-412 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Registration is for the most part a permissive matter under the Act, yet, there are practical
advantages for registering a copyright. Registration serves, for example, as a public record of
the copyright interest, thus, the public has access to the information which may provide a basis
for avoiding infringement. Additionally, a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of
the validity of a copyright. It also provides protection against inaccurately published notice and
conflicting transfers of ownership. For unpublished works, registration protects the owner's
rights to statutory damages and attorney's fees, which would otherwise be lost. HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, at 41-45.
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ing control of the copyrighted work, there are various limitations that
curtail that control."8 These limitations, set forth in the Copyright Act, 9
represent permissible uses of copyrighted works. Permissible uses are ways
in which the public may utilize the work without infringing upon the
owner's exclusive control. These limitations have been delineated because
Congress determined that certain public interests must prevail over the in-
terests of the copyright holder.20 Inherent in these limitations, therefore, is
a balance between encouragement and reward to the author and benefit to
the public through accessibility to information, ideas, and new technologies."
In weighing this balance, courts have often found that the interest in
rewarding the author is secondary; the major priority lies in deriving public
benefits. 2 In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. AiIken,23 for example, the
United States Supreme Court noted that while the immediate effect of the
copyright law is financial reward to the copyright holder, its ultimate pur-
pose is to serve the public.2 '
In examining copyright questions, the courts have been flexible in their
18. The author's exclusive rights are limited in duration and scope. Currently, the duration
of a copyright interest is the life of the author plus an additional-50 years after death. 17
U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Thescope of the copyright interest is limited pur-
suant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 4.
19. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also supra note 4.
20. For a general discussion of these limitations and the interests they seek to protect, see
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-120, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5678-735; OMNIBUS, supra note 3, at 35-100; HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 85-120.
21. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). The Twentieth Cen-
tury Court acknowledged this balance stating:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.
Id. at 156.
For a very early enunciation of the balancing necessitated by the copyright interest, see Lord
Mansfield's statement quoted in Cary v. Longman, I East 358, 361 n.(b) (1801):
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial: the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community,
may be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour,
the other, that the world may not be deprived of the improvements, nor the pro-
gress of the arts be retarded.
Id.
22. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (the primary objective and sole
interest in granting the copyright monopoly lie in the benefits derived by the public). For addi-
tional authorities articulating that reward to the owner is subordinate to the public welfare, see
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975);
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964); H.R. REP. No. 222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909); UNITED STATES OFFICE OF COPYRIGHT, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
(July 1961) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT REVISION].
23. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
24. Id. at 156.
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interpretations of the applicable law.2" In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc.,2 6 the United States Supreme Court observed that the
Copyright Act should not be so narrowly interpreted that new discoveries
and inventions would necessarily be precluded.27 In construing the Act, the
Court was mindful of technological change and, therefore, concluded that a
community antenna, which accentuated broadcast signals over the airwaves,
did not constitute a copyright infringement."
In a similar fashion, the Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken29 recognized that the applicability of the Copyright Act may become
ambiguous in light of technological change." The ambiguity in Twentieth
Century was whether a loud speaker system, which transmitted radio broad-
casts to restaurant patrons, constituted an unlawful performance of copy-
righted works. The Court flexibly construed the statute to find that no
copyright infringement occurred."
A judicially created tool for incorporating flexibility into the Copyright
Act has been the doctrine of fair use.2 Initially adopted as an equitable
measure,33 this doctrine allows courts to examine copyright questions on a
25. This flexibility has allowed the courts to resolve disputes not clearly addressed by the
wording of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (flexibility required where wording of Copyright Act rendered literal
application ambiguous), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
26. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
27. Id. at 395.
28. Id. at 402.
29. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
30. Id. at 156. Other cases have also recognized that new technology renders the plain
meaning of the Copyright Act ambiguous. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Copyright Act ambiguous when presented with the issue of
photocopying), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Ac-
cessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 411-12 (6th Cir. 1925) (radio, while not anticipated by Congress, was
within the purview of the Copyright Act).
31. Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 162.
32. The doctrine has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright
to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding
the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY § 125 (1944). For a general discussion of the fair use doctrine, see NIM.
MER, supra note 3, § 13.04; Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 497
(1977); Rosenfeld, The Constitutional Dimension of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 790 (1975).
33. The fair use doctrine is an equitable judicial creation that originally surfaced in
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). The specific term "fair use," however,
was not recognized until Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). In 1976,
the fair use doctrine was codified into the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). The codification represents merely a Congressional recognition of the doctrine and was
not intended to alter the fair use doctrine in any way. The legislature, in codifying fair use,
acknowledged the need for the doctrine to be flexible, without exact rules in order to allow
equitable examination of the endless variety of copyright questions, "especially during a period
of rapid technological change." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-
[Vol. 31:643
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case-by-case basis."' As a defense to claims of copyright infringement, fair
use provides a basis for upholding certain allegedly infringing uses of
copyrighted works that would appear to be precluded by the wording of the
Act. 35
As the fair use doctrine has developed, the courts have commonly applied
four factors to determine the existence of a fair use. 36 One factor that has
been considered is the purpose and character of the use." Traditionally, if
the unauthorized use of the copyrighted material was for criticism, research
or other independent work, it was more likely that a fair use would be
found to exist.38 The scope of this factor has recently encompassed whether
the individual used the copyrighted material for a commercial or nonprofit
educational purpose. 9 Although a commercial use would not necessarily be
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (the legislative codification of
fair use did not alter the judicial doctrine); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Congress did not intend the codification of fair use to
supplant the judicial doctrine).
34. See NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05. Due to the flexible, ad hoc nature of the doctrine
of fair use, it has been characterized as "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,"
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); and as "so flexible as vir-
tually to defy definition," Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis, Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
35. See Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981) (fair use justifies uses
that appear to violate the Copyright Act yet it was of no avail as a defense to an appropria-
tion from a doctoral dissertation); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Co., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair use allows courts to avoid rigid application of
Copyright Act where to do so would circumvent the Act's purpose of fostering creativity).
36. Despite the lack of an exact definition of fair use, these factors have been employed by
the courts as representing the relevant areas of inquiry. These factors also appear within the
Copyright Act as suggested areas of examination. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
For a general introduction into the fair use factors, see OMNIBUS, supra note 3, at 35-39;
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 85-96; NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05(A); Seltzer, Exemptions and
Fair Use in Copyright, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 215, 230-36 (1977).
37. See Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.) (fair
use must reflect a reasonable purpose), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Columbia Pictures
Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (in determining
fair use, the purpose of the use was of major importance), aff'd, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
38. See Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (fair use encompasses criticism and comment); N.C. Wain-
wright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (classic in-
stances in which courts have allowed unauthorized use of copyrighted works include literary
criticism and parody); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.
Conn. 1972) (under the doctrine of fair use, critics allowed to quote from copyrighted works
without creating infringement), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 848 (1976).
39. The statutory codification explicitly added the wording "including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes," 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980), as an express recognition that this aspect is to be considered along with the
other factors in the fair use analysis. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 historical note (West 1977).
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precluded,'4 such a use would be less likely to constitute a fair use."' Con-
versely, a nonprofit educational purpose would render a favorable inference
of fair use."
Another factor common to the fair use analysis has been the nature of
the copyrighted material. Generally, if the work was of scientific, historical,
or legal merit, it would lend itself to a finding of fair use.43 The courts,
however, have been less rigid in applying the traditional bases under this
factor." For example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc.,3 the court examined whether the nature of the work was such that its
distribution would serve the public's interest in accessibility to information. 6
If so, a fair use was more likely. The court in Iowa State University Research
Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co. 7 considered whether a
40. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (fair use found despite commercial purpose where harm to
plaintiff's copyright interest was not significant); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (commercial exploitation did not
necessarily preclude fair use); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (commer-
cial use, standing alone, insufficient to preclude fair use).
41. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.)
(no fair use application where sole purpose of the use was to appropriate copyrighted work,
outright or by tenuous variation), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Telex Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 362 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (use of competitor's
data processing manuals for user's own profit not fair use), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (use of scientific research to promote
cigarette sales not a fair use).
42. See, e.g., Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 458 F. Supp. 65, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (television news broadcast of a part of plaintiff's song containing music and
lyrics of 21 Italian songs was a fair use); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for
Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. N.H. 1978) (use by opposition of 15 seconds of
political candidate's copyrighted songs was a fair use).
43. See Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.) (fair use
usually arises regarding scientific works or other works dealing with common subject matter),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Norman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 333 F. Supp.
788, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (use by network of historical photographs and descriptions of
famous poet constituted fair use); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F.
Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (law implies consent to reasonable use of copyrighted
materials regarding advancement of arts and science), aff'd, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
44. Under this factor, the courts have examined varying aspects of the nature of the work
other than the traditional fair use indicators. See Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that the commercial nature of the
copyrighted work neither advanced nor hindered the fair use defense); Universal City Studios
v. Sony Corp of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 453 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (considering the mode of
distribution as an aspect of the nature of the work); NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05(A) (one
aspect of the nature of the work is whether the work was available to the user).
45. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
46. Id. at 307. The court noted that this public interest test explains why the fair use doc-
trine has often been applied in cases dealing with science, law, history, and medicine. Id.
47. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
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copyrighted educational film was of essentially the same nature as a commer-
cially motivated reproduction, thus, rendering fair use unavailable as a
defense.' 8 Finally, other courts have implied that if the nature of the work
was purely entertainment, a finding of fair use was less likely.' 9
A third factor that courts have employed to determine fair use is the
amount and substantiality"0 of the copyrighted work used. Traditionally,
the greater the amount of the copyrighted work used, the less likely a fair
use would be found. Some courts have held that a use of substantially all of
the copyrighted material would preclude fair use." In Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States,5" however, the court departed from this traditional
application by finding a fair use in a substantial appropriation of a
copyrighted work. The Wilkins court concluded that other factors relevant
to the photocopying of entire journal articles outweighed the substantiality
concern."
Finally, a fourth factor commonly explored under the fair use doctrine is
the tendency of the allegedly infringing use to decrease the market value of
the original work."' Courts have generally looked to whether the widespread
use of the infringing activity would tend to cause a significantly adverse im-
48. Id. at 61.
49. See Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (appropriation of a mo-
tion picture for use as burlesque not fair use), aff'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); New York Times Co.
v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977) (license to use a work
under the doctrine of fair use was lesser for creative works than for other types of copyrighted
materials); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (insuffi-
cient public interest in an entertainment film to warrant fair use protection), rev'd on other
grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). But see Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (line between transmission of ideas and entertainment too elusive to
draw).
50. Substantiality also encompasses questions of the similarity between two works. Thus,
this factor may involve a qualitative as well as quantitative determination. NIMMER, supra note
3, § 13.05(A).
51. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1978) (verbatim
copying not defensible as fair use), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Rosemont Enter., Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) (extensive verbatim copying could
not meet the reasonableness standard of fair use), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (wholesale copying not a fair use), aff'd, 356
U.S. 43 (1958).
52. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
53. Id. at 1362. The court in Wilkins considered the four fair use factors as well as four
other factors it deemed relevant to the particular issue. See infra note 103 and accompanying
text.
54. As one author points out, this is often viewed as the most important factor. The issue
of harm to plaintifrs copyright interest must be examined along with all the other fair use fac-
tors because it is relevant to more than just the extent of damages caused by the alleged in-
fringement. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05(A).
The district court in Sony recognized three issues to which harm is relevant in a copyright in-
fringement action. These are: whether the use is a fair use; whether an injunction is an ap-
propriate remedy; and if infringement is found, the apportionment of damages. Universal City
Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 451 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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pact on the copyright holder's economic interest. Where such a tendency ex-
ists, this factor weighs against a finding of fair use."
Although these traditional parameters have become apparent in the ap-
plication of the fair use factors, the weight each factor merits is to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis. 6 The doctrine is intended to evaluate
copyright questions on the whole, examining all relevant factors as inter-
related considerations." The fair use factors are not, therefore, necessarily
determinative nor exclusive." Courts have the discretion to incorporate into
the analysis any other factors they deem pertinent to the particular case.
According to the Iowa State Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Co. 9 court, the absence of rigid standards for applying fair use has
allowed the doctrine to protect creativity that would otherwise be stifled
by a strict interpretation of the copyright laws. 60
In view of the flexibility that Congress has shown toward technological
change, as well as the flexibility that the courts have shown through the
implementation of the fair use doctrine, the advent of another technological
55. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169
n.13 (9th Cir. 1977) (explored whether there was a tendency to decrease the market for the
original in determining existence of fair use); Marvin Worth Prod. v. Superior Films Corp.,
319 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (where distribution of a film could be expected to
decrease the value of plaintiff's copyrighted work, fair use was unavailable); Mura v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (in determining fair use,
court looked to the tendency to interfere with the market for the copyrighted work).
56. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (the delineation between fair
use and infringement must be drawn on the basis of the facts of the case), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943)
(fair use depends on the facts of the case); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y.) (distinction between fair use and infringement requires
examination of the specific facts involved), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5679 (the doctrine lacks precise definition and, thus, must be adapted to unique facts of
each case); NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05(A) (the weight ascribed to each factor is discre-
tionary depending on the case).
57. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (the factors that bear
upon fair use must be considered in concert), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Key Maps,
Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 37 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (the fair use factors must be evaluated in
concert); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y.)
(fair use is determined by the usual factors as well as all relevant evidence), aff'd, 500 F.2d
1221 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th
Cir. 1943)).
58. The legislative history behind the 1976 amendment of the Copyright Act sets forth
Congress' acceptance of the fair use doctrine and the legislative intent behind codifying the
doctrine and its common factors. The history explicitly states that these factors are suggestive
of the relevant inquiries but are not to be determinative in every case. The determination of
fair use is left to judicial discretion. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5678-79. See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 historical note
(West 1977) (the endless variety of situations that can arise precludes formation of exact rules
under fair use).
59. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 60.
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invention would appear to be acceptable under the copyright laws. In
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America,"' however, the court
found video recorders to be an unacceptable source of copyright infringe-
ment.
THE SONY DECISION AND ANALYSIS
As holders of copyright interests in various television and motion picture
works, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions brought a
copyright infringement action62 against the manufacturer, distributor, and
ultimate consumer of a popular video cassette recorder.63 The plaintiffs
charged that off-the-air video recording, even in the context of private,
noncommercial use, violated their copyright interests." Although neither
Universal Studios nor Walt Disney had suffered any direct harm or
monetary loss,65 they claimed that the continued use of video recorders
61. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
62. A detailed statement of the facts of this case is set forth in the district court's opinion,
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432-41 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
therefore, the circuit court did not find it necessary to restate the facts in its decision. Univer-
sal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1981).
Universal's copyrighted materials consist of motion pictures created for theater viewing and
in some cases subsequent television licensing. Universal markets prerecorded videotapes of
theater films, including pictures that have previously been aired on television. Universal's
copyright interests also include movies made for television. These movies are produced ex-
clusively for first run, network showings and some are then licensed for network reruns and/or
syndication to local stations. 480 F. Supp. at 433-34.
Disney's copyrighted interests include a variety of animated and live action works. While
only three of Disney's full length, animated features have been licensed to television, it does
license other theatrical film works. Disney, like Universal, has marketed prerecorded video
tapes of various copyrighted materials. Additionally, Disney has a long running contract with
NBC to air features weekly on "The Wonderful World of Disney" as well as syndicated pro-
grams such as "The New Mickey Mouse Club." Id. at 434-35.
63. 659 F.2d 963, 964. The named defendants were Sony Corporation and Sony Corpora-
tion of America, the manufacturer and distributer of a commercially marketed video cassette
recorder, the Betamax; Doyle Dane Bernach, Inc., the advertising agency responsible for pro-
moting the Betamax; four retail stores that sold the Betamax and made copies of various
television programs as a demonstration of the product; and one individual, William Griffiths,
apparently named in exemplary capacity only for home-use infringement via the Betamax, as
no damages or costs were sought from him. Id.
64. Id. at 964. In addition to whether off-the-air copying by means of video recorders con-
stitutes copyright infringement, four other issues were examined by the Sony court: whether
the corporate defendants could be held liable for home video recording under direct or con-
tributory infringement or vicarious liability; whether injunction or another remedy would ap-
propriately redress damage; whether the retail stores violated the copyright laws by using
prerecorded tapes to demonstrate the Betamax; and whether a claim for unfair competition
was valid. Id. at 964-65. The scope of this Note is limited, however, to the initial inquiry of
home use infringement.
65. 480 F. Supp. at 439. The district court found the issue of harm to be relevant to three
inquiries: whether home use video recording is a fair use; whether an injunction is appropriate;
and damages if infringement were found. Id. at 451.
The circuit court did not find the issue of harm to be relevant to the liability question. It
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would cause them irrevocable damage. 66 This alleged damage would stem
from a decrease in the value of their copyright interests by depleting rerun
value and diminishing the live television audience. 61
Denying the plaintiffs' claim, the trial court concluded that private non-
commercial video recording did not constitute copyright infringement.68 On
appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
home use of video cassette recorders amounted to a violation of the
copyright interests in the owners of the televised materials. 69 The Sony court
found that neither the statute itself nor the doctrine of fair use justified
home video recording. 70
Initially, the Sony court set the tone for its examination of the infringe-
ment issue by indicating its belief that compensation to the copyright holder
was more than a secondary concern. 7' The court then proceeded to conduct
two inquiries. First, it examined whether the Copyright Act could be inter-
preted as implying an exception for the noncommercial use of video
recorders 2. 7  Under this inquiry, the court found that the wording of the Act
was unequivocally clear 3 and, thus, provided no basis for an implied video
recording exception to the copyright holder's exclusive control.7
suggested that the district court put too great a burden on the appellants by requiring them to
show damage. 659 F.2d at 973-74.
66. 480 F. Supp. at 439. To the contrary, with steadily increasing revenues, each appellant
had experienced a record year of profitability during the district court trial. Id.
67. Id. at 442. To support this contention appellants introduced testimony as to possible
future harm video recorders would cause. Although this testimony, offered by executives from
each of the appellant corporations, predicted a harmful effect on the market for their works,
there was no testimony as to what point in the future video recorder use would become
detrimental to appellants. Id.
68. Id. at 442. The district court found that the Copyright Act did not grant the owner full
monopoly power over his work and thus did not grant control over noncommercial use of a
copyrighted material within the privacy of an individual's home. After examining the relevant
legislative direction and the doctrine of fair use, the district court concluded that no copyright
infringement was present and that a fair use did exist. Id.
69. 659 F.2d at 969.
70. Id. at 971-74.
71. 659 F.2d at 965. The court's language attempted to discredit the authorities that have
specifically held the copyright holder's economic interest to be a secondary consideration to the
primary interest of benefiting the public. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
72. 659 F.2d at 965. The district court found a possible implication for a video exception in
the sound recording amendment to the Copyright Act. This amendment brought sound record-
ings within the scope of copyright protection but allowed an exception for private, noncom-
mercial use or reproduction use of sound recordings. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying
text. Although the district court found this exception to be persuasive, 480 F. Supp. at 444-46,
the appellate court found it to be irrelevant to the .issue of home video recording on the basis
that the wording of the statute was clear and that no reference to legislative history was
necessary. 659 F.2d at 968.
73. 659 F.2d at 966. The district court, however, cited legislative history demonstrating that
Congress did, in fact, touch on video recording during its implementation of the sound record-
ing amendment, thus finding that the Copyright Act was not unequivocally clear with respect
to video recording. 480 F. Supp. at 444-46. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
74. 659 F.2d at 966.
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Audiovisual reproduction is specifically addressed under limited cir-
cumstances by the Copyright Act."5 The court interpreted the existing
statutory treatment of video recording to mean that no general exception
for home video recording was warranted.
6
The court's second inquiry examined fair use to determine whether video
cassette recording could be upheld under this equitable doctrine. Prior to
addressing the four standard factors, Sony explicitly stated its conclusion
that no fair use existed." It proceeded, nevertheless, to discuss the fair use
factors, affording great deference to the parameters traditionally applied.
In analyzing the purpose and character of the use, the court determined
that the noncommercial nature of private video recording was not a saving
characteristic.78  Although this factor now incorporates "commercial
nature 7 9 within its scope, the Sony court stated that more was required
than a simple commercial/noncommercial distinction. 0 The fact that the
recording takes place in the home was also found to have no mitigating ef-
fect on the purpose and character of the alleged infringement." ,
With respect to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the Sony court briefly stated that a fair use would be less likely where the
work was primarily of entertainment value.8 2 It also found that the manner
in which Universal Studios and Walt Disney chose to distribute their works
was insignificant to the analysis. 3 The fact that plaintiffs voluntarily chose
to disseminate their works over public airwaves was irrelevant.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This section provides for the reproduction of
copyrighted works for noncommercial library and archive use. Primarily, the Sony court focused
on subsection (h) which exempts audiovisual works, except such works dealing with news, from
portions of the § 108 grant of permissible uses. The Sony court deemed this to indicate special
protection for audiovisual works not afforded to sound recordings. Thus, according to the
court, this section served a twofold purpose. It demonstrated that the sound recording amend-
ment, see infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text, was not analogous to the issue of video
recording since Congress treated them as separate categories under the Act. Additionally, this
section demonstrated that the Act itself was unequivocally clear because Congress would have
addressed the home video issue, as it did § 108, if it had seen fit. 659 F.2d at 967-68.
The exclusion of works under subsection (h) is not, however, absolute because the legislative
history behind § 108 states that the doctrine of fair use is fully applicable to justify reproduc-
tion of such works, even though they appear to be precluded by the statute. See H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 78, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659,
5692.
76. 659 F.2d at 967-68.
77. Id. at 971-72. The court inductively reached its conclusion and then referred to the fair
use factors in support, rather than deducting its conclusion from the fair use analysis.
78. Id. at 972.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 39.
80. 659 F.2d at 972. The district court, however, found the noncommercial nature of video
recording as well as the private nature of the use to warrant a positive inference from this fac-
tor. 480 F. Supp. at 454.
81. 659 F.2d at 972.
82. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
83. 659 F.2d at 972. The district court did find this factor to be significant as it incor-
porated all relevant considerations into its analysis. According to the district court, the volun-
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Relying heavily upon the substantiality of the use, the Sony court cited
several decisions illustrating the traditional focus of this factor.14 Previously,
courts have held that a finding of fair use was precluded where the allegedly
infringing use was of substantially all of the copyrighted work. 5 The Sony
court determined that this interpretation should not be altered. 6 The
reproduction capabilities of video recorders enable owners to record entire
television programs as they are broadcast into the home. The recorders pro-
vide, therefore, for the reproduction of a substantial amount of each
copyrighted work. Accordingly, the substantiality of video recorder use
weighed heavily against a fair use finding.87
Despite its seemingly preclusive finding of substantiality, the court pro-
ceeded to discuss the element of harm, stating that the cumulative effects of
video recording must be considered beyond the limited factual setting of the
case.8 Although Universal Studios and Walt Disney could not establish any
present injury, the Sony court concluded that subsequent use of the
reproduced works would tend to decrease the market for the original
because the copy would be used as the functional equivalent of the
original.8 Widespread use of video cassette recorders would, according to
the court, lead to "insuperable obstacles" 90 for Universal Studios and Walt
Disney in protecting their statutory interests.
CRITIQUE
Although the Sony court correctly observed that the public must rely on
authors and inventors to supply advancements in the arts and sciences," its
mechanical analysis of the fair use doctrine evinced too strong an empathy
tary transmittal by the copyright owners was also important to the issue of harm. Because the
television. viewers do not pay directly for broadcasts, the harm was rendered even more
speculative. 480 F. Supp. at 453.
84. 659 F.2d at 973. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir.
1978) (substantiality alone may be preclusive to a fair use finding), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979). See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977); Rosemont Enter., Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) (both supporting the preclusive
weight of substantiality). But see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct.
Cl. 1973) (there is no inflexible rule that substantiality be preclusive in all cases), aff'd, 420
U.S. 376 (1975); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 455 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (the cases holding substantiality to be preclusive indicated this concern primarily
where substantiality caused harm to plaintiff).
85. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
86. 659 F.2d at 973.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 974. The district court, however, found that the ramifications presented by the
video issue extended beyond the boundaries of the case. Noting that the legislature should be
encouraged to clarify the dispute, the district court chose not to embark on a course of judicial
legislating by exploring all possible uses and consequences. 480 F. Supp. at 442.
89. 659 F.2d at 974. This rationale is known as the "functional test" which has been ap-
plied in some cases to preclude a finding of fair use. See NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05(B).
90. 659 F.2d at 974.
91. Id. at 965.
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toward the copyright holder."2 Contrary to the Sony court's finding, the
Copyright Act does not require that the copyright owner be allowed to,"ex-
ploit the market"' 3 for his work." Instead, the copyright law requires a
balancing of the public interest against the rights of the author or
inventor." In its reluctance to depart from the traditional applications of
the doctrine of fair use, the Sony court avoided an equitable balancing of
these interests.
The court examined the fair use factors in a cursory manner, more as
support for its determination that an infringement did exist than as a basis
for extracting its conclusion. The court failed to approach fair use as an
analysis involving interrelated considerations." Rather, it touched on the
factors individually, noting how in-home video recording fell short of the
traditionally defined standards for each. In doing so, the Sony court
overlooked the judicial and legislative intent that the doctrine be flexible
and that its value as a defense be determined through a case-by-case ap-
proach. 97 The issue of private noncommercial video recording presented a
case of first impression and, thus, presented a use that had not been con-
templated as the fair use doctrine developed.' 8 The Sony decision, in effect,
stagnated fair use by affording- no special consideration to this new
technological development.
In adapting the copyright law to encompass technological change,
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States" offered a more practical ap-
proach. The Sony court, however, rejected the Wilkins decision as a
dangerous extension of fair use."00 The Wilkins court found the doctrine ap-
92. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. See also H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909) (copyright is intended primarily to benefit the public, not the author).
93. 659 F.2d at 974.
94. The fact that the copyright law does not require that the copyright holder have the sole
interest in exploiting the market is evidenced by the limitations Congress and the courts have
imposed upon the holder's exclusive rights. Courts have repeatedly recognized the balance in-
herent in the copyright law, thus, the holder's interest in his market is not absolute. See supra
notes 18-20 and accompanying text. See also COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 22, at 6
(copyright law must strike a balance between the author's interest in controlling his work and
the public's interest in the widest possible dissemination of those works).
95. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
96. The district court in Sony stated that due to the unique factual setting all relevant con-
siderations, in addition to the four fair use factors, were to be used in balancing the equities,
with no single factor being determinative. 480 F. Supp. at 456. See H..R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5679 (each case rais-
ing a fair use question must be decided on the basis of its own specific facts).
97. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
98. The district court expressed that in this case of first impression, fair use presented a
viable approach. The court stated that the advent of video recorder technology invited applica-
tion of the fair use doctrine. 480 F. Supp. at 448.
99. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
100. 659 F.2d at 971. The Sony court found that recognizing "new technology which makes
possible the mass reproduction of copyrighted materials . . . places a strain on the fair use doc-
trine." Id. Contra COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 22, at 30 (technological advances that
provide for in-home video reproduction cannot be precluded by the copyright laws).
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plicable to the photocopying of copyrighted medical journal articles for
research purposes.' 10 Although Wilkins is factually distinguishable," 2 its
merit rests in the stance the court adopted in examining the advent of
photocopy technology.
The Wilkins court balanced the fair use factors as well as four other con-
siderations it deemed relevant to the case.'03 In view of the speculative
nature of the harm' 4 and the fact that medical research would be impaired
if such reproduction were not allowed, the court recognized a fair use.' 5
Although the photocopying involved a substantial amount of the
copyrighted works, Wilkins observed that the traditional parameters were
not inflexible rules, excluding certain uses in all cases.06 As a result, the
substantiality factor could be outweighed by other concerns. Furthermore,
the court noted that until clear legislative direction was issued, fair use
could be employed to protect the public from bearing the loss.1'0 Thus, the
Wilkins court thoroughly examined the issue before it and based its deter-
101. 487 F.2d at 1362.
102. As the district court noted, the precedential value of Wilkins is limited to its specific
factual setting. The district court found it persuasive, however, for its application of the fair
use doctrine in a case of new technology and a noncommercial use. 480 F. Supp. at 450.
103. 487 F.2d at 1354-61. The other four factors were: the nonprofit status of the defen-
dants; the copies were used only for research purposes; the practice had been going on,
unrestrained for many years; medical science would be impaired if such copying were discon-
tinued. Id.
104. The Wilkins court found that the evidence did not support a presumption of harm,
thus, it refused to make a mechanical assumption that a tendency toward harm existed. 487
F.2d at 1359.
105. Id. at 1353-54. The public interest in Wilkins was medical research, thus, the nature of
the copyrighted work did fall within a traditional category of the fair use analysis although the
substantial amount did not.
In Sony, the public interest is technology. While this interest is not reflected in the nature of
the work, it represents a strong public concern that cannot be ignored. The technology in
Sony,-video recorders, provides the public with greater accessibility to information and enter-
tainment. This would seem to be in keeping with the general stature of the copyright laws. See
Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 573, 608 (1979)
(too rigid an application of the substantiality criterion would severely limit dissemination of
copyrighted works by new technologies). See also Brill, Will Betamax Be Busted?, 89 ESQUIRE
19, 20 (June 20, 1978). "If science has developed a way for Junior to watch Monday Night
Football the next day, why should some greedy movie companies be able to use a stubborn
reading of the law to stand in the way?" Id. at 22 (quoting Harvard Law School copyright
professor Arthur Miller).
106. 487 F.2d at 1353. The Wilkins court discounted the general rule on substantiality as be-
ing unsupported by actual practice. The court cited as example, several instances of daily life
in which copying of entire works is commonly accepted, such as the photocopying of
newspaper articles given from one friend to another or even from judges to colleagues in daily
legal life. Id.
107. Id. at 1354. The district court in Sony, like the court in Wilkins, limited the scope of
its holding to the facts of the case due to the potential magnitude of a broad holding and the
probable effect such a holding would have on both the industry and the public. The district
court felt it more conservative to save the video dispute for the legislature but, until such ac-
tion was forthcoming, it chose to allow the public the benefit of the doubt. 480 F. Supp. at
442. The Ninth Circuit, however, chose to impose a drastic holding on a quickly growing in-
dustry, thus, depriving the public for the sake of speculative harm. 659 F.2d at 974.
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mination on an equitable balance between the competing interests rather
than a mechanical analysis of the fair use formula.
Under a similar balancing of the equities, the Sony court could have con-
cluded that the private noncommercial use of video recorders constituted a
fair use. It relied on substantiality, however, as weighing heavily against
fair use, seemingly to the point of this single factor being determinative.
While the court stated that it need not rest its conclusion on
substantiality,'08 it cited case law holding substantiality to be preclusive.'0 9
This factor, therefore, emerged as the impetus for the negative fair use
determination.' '
A substantial appropriation of a copyrighted work does not always dic-
tate the absence of fair use. Other factors, as in the Wilkins decision, may
be sufficient to outweigh substantiality. The Sony court's strong dependence
on this factor undercut the public interest in accessibility to progress, an in-
terest that the copyright laws were created to protect rather than hinder."'
Effectively, the Sony decision suggests that the public can be deprived of
the benefits of video recorder technology and that electronic progress can
be impeded by the existence of copyright laws."'
Moreover, the Sony court overlooked other strong considerations that
could have outweighed the negative implications of substantiality. In addi-
tion to the significant public interest at stake, the court disregarded the
speculative nature of the harm."' A finding of harm required a number of
108. 659 F.2d at 973.
109. Id. The court cited Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979), which held that the substantiality factor was the one
preclusive consideration in the fair use calculus. Id. at 758.
110. The Sony court's discussion of the first two factors was passive, merely stating that a
use not falling within the traditional parameters weighed against fair use. Its discussion of
substantiality, however, indicated that the court viewed this factor as its strongest support. The
court stated that it did not need to rest its conclusion on this factor but failed to state exactly
what, instead, it would rest on. 659 F.2d at 973.
111. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
112. See Brill, Will Betamax Be Busted?, 89 ESQUIRE 19 (June 20, 1978). In referring to the
district court in Sony, prior to its disposition, the author stated: this "may end up being a
classic example of law not keeping up with progress. Then it will be up to Congress to give us
back the Betamax." Id.
Cf. OMNIBUS, supra note 3, at 23. This authority suggests that the copyright law has diffi-
culty in keeping up with technological advancements.
Revising the U.S. copyrights law has proved to be an undertaking built on shifting
sands. As new technologies evolve, as new means of distributing intellectual works
develop, as commercial importance of intellectual creativity grows, the battles be-
tween conflicting interest have to be fought all over again, and new compromises
between legitimate demands have to be forged.
Id.
113. See Comment, All's Fair in Love and Private Video Recording-The Copyright In-
fringement Issues in the Sony Case, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 620, 629-30 (1981) (invalid assump-
tion that harm will be caused by viewing video tapes rather than watching television because
video watchers are part of a market who are looking for more in an entertainment form than
television offers).
Studies show that impact upon television markets will not be substantial. See Public TV
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presumptions by the court. Such presumptions include that video recorder
owners would "library""' tapings of televised programs, that they would
be prone to view self-recorded tapes rather than live television, and that in
taping the programs, commercials would be omitted."' While the harm fac-
tor requires only a tendency to reduce the value of the original,"6 6 it is this
tendency that is speculative in Sony. If, as studies have shown,'' video
recorder owners are not inclined to library tapes or view self-recorded tapes
more than once, the tendency toward harm is tenuous. Additionally, from
an equitable standpoint, the Sony court failed to consider that the television
and motion picture industries have already proven themselves resilient to
other technological advancements such as cable and pay television."'
Although the presence of video recorders may change the plaintiffs'
marketing strategies and advertising considerations," 9 the copyright law was
not meant to protect the copyright holder's economic monopoly from such
change. '20
Study Says VCRs Don't Detract from Viewing Levels, BROADCASTING 46 (July 21, 1980) (au-
diences still watch the same amount of television, thus, there is little danger of negative effect
upon television); Not to Worry, BROADCASTING 48 (May 12, 1980) (the 1980's will probably
only show a 10% decrease in audience size due to all new technologies combined, which will be
countered by a 10% increase in audience households).
114. "Library" is a term of art that refers to the accumulation of previously recorded
tapes by the video cassette owner for viewing at a later date.
115. See Comment, All's Fair in Love and Private Video Recording-The Copyright In-
fringement Issues in the Sony Case, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 620, 629 (1981) (harm due to video
recorders based on speculative presumptions).
116. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
117. See Public TV Study Says VCR's Don't Detract from Viewing Levels, BROADCASTING
46 (July 21, 1980) (68% of all playback of home recorded programs occurs within two days of
broadcast with little evidence of librarying); Home Video Fever High Tech in the Living
Room, HIGH FIDELITY & MUSICAL AMERICA 102 (June 1980) (most recorder owners only view
their self-recorded tapes once). See also Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. at 438 (studies showed that 70.4% of recorded tapes were viewed only once; 55.8% of
video recorder owners had fewer than 10 tapes in their collection).
118. See 480 F. Supp. at 469. MCA chairman Louis Wasserman testified to this resilience at
the district court trial, stating: "[p]eople that have constantly forecast the doom of a particular
industry in the entertainment industry have historically been wrong. . . They forecast the
doom of radio stations when television developed on the horizon. Stations are more profitable
today than they have ever been." Id.
The district court further noted that television productions by plaintiffs were more profitable
than ever at the time of the trial and no concrete evidence was offered to support a future
adverse effect on their profitability. Id. See also Brill, Will Betamax Be Busted?, 89 ESQUIRE
19 (June 20, 1978). With regard to the Betamax, the author stated: "[siome of the doomsday
claims seem farfetched, such as the one that financially crucial syndication rights (to sell old
prime time shows to stations for daytime reruns) won't be sold because millions of Americans
will instead record libraries of shows like 'I Love Lucy'." Id. at 22.
119. See 480 F. Supp. at 452 (the Betamax, as well as other technical innovations, may
cause plaintiffs to alter marketing strategies).
This same result was inflicted upon radio as television became popular. Radio changed its
format to music and news in order to provide the public with an alternative to television.
Video recorders are not, however, anticipated to cause the need for drastic change. See supra
note 113.
120. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394, 419 n.15 (1974).
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Within the court's discussion of the remaining two factors, the purpose
of the use and the nature of the copyrighted work, it failed to give weight
to several relevant concerns. The significant aspects of video recording
that should have been balanced by the court are the in-home and non-
commercial nature of the copying, the fact that the reproduced works can
be informational and educational as well as entertaining, and that the
reproduced works are broadcast freely over the public airwaves. The Sony
court dismissed these concerns, however, as lending no support to the
analysis. 2' While individually, these concerns would not be sufficient to
render a determination of fair use, taken together, with the standard fac-
tors, they may have been sufficient to warrant such a finding. A balancing
of all relevant factors could have established a fair use and, thus, as in
Wilkins, protected the public from bearing the loss.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
One of the most significant concerns that the Sony court omitted from its
analysis of home video infringement was the home-use exception set forth
under the sound recording amendment.'22 The Copyright Act was amended
in 1971 to include sound recordings within the scope of copyrightable
materials.'23 In creating this new copyright interest, Congress, within the
amendment's legislative history, specifically addressed the issue of private,
noncommercial sound recording. It found that reproducing a sound record-
ing for noncommercial use would not amount to a copyright infringement.'2 '
Congress concluded that the pervasiveness of private, nonprofit recording,
as well as the difficulty in enforcing a ban on such use, necessitated this
result.'2
This home-use exception to the copyright holder's exclusive rights in
sound recordings presents an analogous situation to the video recording
dispute. The Sony court refused to find relevance in the home-use excep-
tion,'2 6 thereby, overlooking two major points. First, in-home sound
recording and in-home video recording are virtually indistinguishable pro-
121. 659 F.2d at 972-74.
122. The Sony court did address the sound recording amendment but found it irrelevant to
the video issue. The court stated that Congress was simply not addressing video recording. Id.
at 967-68.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
124. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1566, 1572. The report provides:
Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home record-
ing, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where
the home recording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or other-
wise capitalizing commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained to-
day, and the record producers and performers would be in no different position




126. 659 F.2d at 967-68.
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cesses. 1' Both involve reproducing copyrighted works that are voluntarily
broadcast by the copyright holders into private homes. In addition both in-
volve future use of the recording for a private, noncommercial purpose.
Thus, the justification for allowing one form of reproduction while pro-
hibiting the other appears tenuous.
The second point that Sony overlooked was that the same considerations
that supported the home-use exception for sound recordings have now
manifested themselves in the context of video recording. Prior to the home-
use exception, private, noncommercial use of sound recorders was a com-
mon and unrestrained practice.'25 Furthermore, Congress did not foresee a
significantly detrimental effect on the copyright holders through such a
use.'2 9 Similarly, video recorders are currently being used in many homes on
an unrestrained basis.' 30 There does not appear to be any feasible means of
controlling this use, absent removing video recorders from the market.' 31
This solution, however, would leave unresolved the problem of recorders
that are already in private homes.
The similarity between sound and video recording was acknowledged in
Congressional hearings on the sound recording amendment. In a Senate
committee hearing, the Assistant Register of Copyrights noted that the ad-
vent of video recorders would be beyond the control or scope of the
copyright laws.' Although video recorders did not pose an immediate
threat, the Senate hearings indicated that intruding into private homes or
creating legislation to prevent home video recording would not be viable
127. See Comment, All's Fair in Love and Private Video Recording-The Copyright In-
fringement Issues in the Sony Case, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 621 (1981) (the acts of making
recordings of sound and recordings of images are indistinguishable for infringement purposes);
Comment, Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1218 (no
difference between the acts necessary to reproduce sound or pictures). But see Brill, Will the
Betamax Be Busted?, 89 ESQUIRE 19 (June 20, 1978) (the process of sound reproduction is less
advantageous).
128. See supra note 124.
129. Id.
130. The 1981 production figure for the Electronic Industries Association of Japan, which
accounts for 90% of the world market of video recorders, was approximately 8.4 million.
BUSINESS WEEK 185 (July 20, 1981).
131. Alternatives have been suggested such as the imposition of a tax on the sale of video
recorders to provide for a continuing royalty payment to copyright holders. This raises the
question, however, of how to adequately apportion the proceeds. A second alternative that has
been suggested is to equip the recorders with an automatic erase as the tape is being viewed.
The problem with this suggestion is that it would also erase the commercially prerecorded
tapes. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981) (ap-
propriate solutions include injunctive relief or a continuing royalty); Marsh, Betamax and Fair
Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49 (1981) (video recorders could be equip-
ped with an automatic erase). See also the West German Copyright Act of Sept. 9, 1965, 51
Bundesgesetzblatt 1273 (1965), reprinted in Comment, New Technology and the Law of
Copyright: Reprography and Computers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 939, 971 n.104 (1968) (a flat
fee shall be paid from the manufacturer to the copyright holder).
132. Hearings on S. 646 Before the Subcomm, No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971) (statement of Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of
Copyrights).
[Vol. 31:643
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS v. SONY
alternatives.' 33 Additionally, ten years prior to the sound recording amend-
ment, the Register of Copyrights published its intent that future
technological advancements that would make home video recording possible
would not lead to infringing uses under the copyright law."3
Due to the substantial similarities between sound and video recording, the
Sony court erred in disregarding this analogous legislative direction. Future
courts examining the home video issue should view the sound recording
amendment as the most pertinent indication of Congressional intent. The
amendment's history, as well as the several statements acknowledging video
recording, provide a basis for expanding fair use to encompass this
technology. Acceptance by other courts of the Sony precedent will effective-
ly freeze the development of fair use in its present state, a result inconsis-
tent with the equitable nature of the doctrine.
If the video dispute progresses further through the courts, and the ra-
tionale of Sony is adopted, then legislative action will be needed. The
legislature recognized the need to exempt noncommercial home-use of
sound recordings from the scope of copyright infringement. If, as the
legislative history suggests, it also intends to exempt the private, noncom-
mercial use of video recorders, this intention should, similarly, be expressed.
An appropriate legislative action would be to codify the home-use exception
with respect to both noncommercial sound and video recording.
CONCLUSION
The Sony court employed a mechanical analysis in this case of first im-
pression. With a view toward the purpose and intent behind the Copyright
Act and the fair use doctrine, however, such an analysis was improper. The
court's decision necessitates acceptance of the proposition that the public
has less at stake than the copyright holders. This is not, however, simply an
issue of whether video copies of various television broadcasts are superior
in importance to compensating the artists. Rather, it is a question of
whether technology may be impeded by the existence of the copyright laws.
The danger inherent in allowing a strict construction of the Copyright Act
to dictate the fate of home-use video recorders is that it ultimately favors
the copyright owner's economic interest over the public's interest in pro-
gress. Such a result was not contemplated by the Act.
The home video issue is analogous to the sound recording amendment's
home-use exception, which could have supplied a basis for a fair use finding
in Sony. This exception should be adopted in future examinations of the
video dispute. If this suggested approach is not accepted, Congress should
rectify the course of the judiciary and issue its specific intent with respect to
the noncommercial home-use of video cassette recorders.
Mary T. Zerega
133. Id.
134. COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 22, at 30.
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